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D=Hlin is Fxft-eS-DdiVei'--Valdily of Cbzfrad-EVidence.
When there is evidence that the derndt an& Is cousin bought a
-quantty of wheat flugh rputable membes of the Chicago Boad
-of Trade, which was delivereff to them i% the fom of warehoue
receipts; that atnal delivey on demand was intended by al parties,
;ad that ftey coul have go the wheat on demand; that they carded
it a while on margin with sai deales; that wheat depredate and
they cosed ou at a loss, whic was all paid by the cousin, deendant
givig himt the note in snt in-sieupment of Is share-in. view of these
facts a fii that the note was not fiunded on a gambling consider&-
fionwilnotbe iese&d
" - Funni . --
No gambling device has ever afforded the votaries of fortune
such opportunities or such incentives -s the invention of
"future" contracts; and at no time in the .history of -the-
world has gambling been carried to such ruinous excess.
The tales of old-world extravagance -and. of ante-bellum-
recklessness fade into obscurity beside the millions that are
staked on a single deal in wheat or corn; aid no mania for
cards could ever have wrought the widespread loss and
ittffering due to the cold-blooded manipulations of a G.uld
or of a Fisk But the effects of such dealings belong to the
,domain of economic science; the law is,only concerned with
their validity.
- The forms of these contracts are as numerous as the condi-
1 Reported in 6 . I$, Rep. "6.
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tions of human affairs; and their variety is bewildering to any
one not to the manner born--or at least bred. Starting with
a simple "option" (to buy or to sell) we are soon introduced
into a labyrinth of "puts" and "calls," sales "short" and
"long," and the like, until we reach the highest development
of the stock gambler's inventive genius in the famous "strad-
dle," that marvelous machine designed to rescue the unhappy
operator from being impaled on either horn of a dilemma,
though having a peculiar tendency to -transfix him with both.
But whatever the name, and whatever the outward form, a
"future" contract.means substantially a contract to buy or to
sell, or to deliver or to receive commodities at some future
time.
I. A contract to buy or to sell goods, the execution of
which is postponed to some future time, is riot necessarily
invalid, even though the goods are not in the possession of
the vendor, nor has he contracted to procure them from
another, nor has any reasonable expectation of becoming
possessed of them by the time appointed, otherwise than by
purchasing them after the contract is made: Hibblewhite V'.
McMorine, 5 M. & W. 462; Ashton v. Dakin, 4 H. & N. 867;
Bartlett v. Smith, 13 Fed. Rep. 263; White v. Barber, 123
U. S. 392; S. C., 8 Sup. Ct, Rep. 221; Bibb v. Allen,.
149 U. S. 481; S. C., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950; Wolcott v.
Heath, 78 Ill. 433; Pixley v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 351; Logan zr.
Brown, 81 Ill. 415; Cole v. Milmine, 88 Ill. 349; Apple-
man v. Fisher, 34 Md. 540; Williams v. Tiedemann,
6 Mo. App. 269; Cassard v. Hinman, i Bosw. (N. Y.) 207;
Tyler v. Barrows, 6 Robt. (N. Y.) lO4; Kingsbury v. Kirwin,
43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 451 ; Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195 ;
S. C., 2o N. E. Rep. 203; Brua's App., 55 Pa. 294; Smith v.
Bouvier, 70 Pa. 325. Nor is a future sale, with the privilege
reserved on either side to execute the contract or *not, neces-
sarily an illegal contract. "The vendee of goods may expect
to produce or acquire them in time for a future delivery, and
while wishing to make a market for them, is unwilling to enter
into an absolute obligation to deliver, and therefore bargains
for an option which, while it relieves him from liability, assures
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h'm of a sale, in case he is able to deliver, and the purchaser
n.ay in the same way guard himself against loss beyond the
consideration paid for the option, in case of his inability to
take the goods. There is no inherent vice in such a contract:"
Bigelow z. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202; S. C., 26 Am. Rep. 573;
Brown v. Hall, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 177; Perryman v. Wolffe,
93 Ala. 290; S. C., 9. So. Rep. 148; Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall,
72 Pa. 155; Maxton v. Gheen, 75 Pa. 166. It makes no
difference that the transaction is a speculative one: Stewart v.
Parnell, 147 Pa., 523; S. C., 29 W. N. C. 537; 23 Atl- Rep.
838. If the intention of the parties is to execute the contract,
in case the option i exercised, by an actual delivery and
receipt of the subject matter, the contract is valid: Sondheim
v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71; Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570; Farnum
v. Pitcher, 1.5 I Mass. 470; S. C., 24 N. E. Rep. 590; Jones v.
Shale, 34 Mo. App. 302; Noyes v. Spaulding, 27 Vt. 420.
The delivery need not be manual; it, may be. symbolical, by
means of warehouse receipts, bills of lading, or the like: Fisher
v. Fisher (Ind.), the principal case, 36 N. E. Rep. 296; Farnum
v. Pitcher, supra; Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich. 337.
II. If, however, there is no actual delivery intended, but the
transaction is to be settled by the payment of the difference
between the market price and that fixed by the contract, this
amounts in legal effect to a mere wager -on the price- of the
goods, and the contract is accordingly held void, at common
law, as well as by statute in many State'. "Such contracts
are against public policy, because they tend to unsettle the
natural course of trade, and tempt the parties to them to work
for a rise or fall in the prices of the comihodities on which-
their wagers are laid, without regard to actual values, and by
methods calculated to promote their own profit at the expense
or ruin of others, without reciprocity of benefit. .And, besides
these evils, there are others, more immediate to the parties,
culminating from time to time in loss of fortune and character,
defalcations, crime and domestic misery, evils which, though
they donot always follow, yet follow so often that they have not
been overlooked by the courts:" Flagg v. Gilpin, 17 R. I. io;
S. C., 19 Atl. Rep. IO84; Grizewood v. Blane, ii C. B. 525;
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Barry -,. Croskey, 2 J. & S. i; Bartlettv. Smith, 13 Fed. Rep. 263;
Embrey v. Jamison, 131 U. S. 336; S. C., 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 776;
Cobb v. Prell, 16 Cent. L. J. 453; Justh v. Holliday, 17 Cent.
L. J. 56; Lee v. Boyd, 86 Ala. 283; S. C., 5 So. Rep. 489;
Pickering v. Cease, 79 Ill. 328; Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Il.
496; S. C., 16 N. E. Rep. 646; Watte v. Costello, 40 Ill.
App. 3o; Beadles v. McElrath, 85 Ky. 230; Rumsey v.
Berry, 65 Me. 575; Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich. 337;
Waterman v. Buckland, i Mo. App. 45; Cockrell v. Thomp-
son, 85 1\1o. 510; Rudolf v. Winters, 7 Neb. 125; Yerkes v.
Salomon, ii Hun. (N. Y.) 471; Peck v. Doran, 46 -Hun.
(N. Y.) 454; Story v. Salomon, 71 N. Y. 420; Williams v.
Carr, 8o N. C. 294; Lester v. Buel (Ohio), 3o N. E. Rep.
821; Brua's App., 55 Pa. 294; North v. Phillips, 89 Pa.
250; Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543; S. C., 15 S. W.
Rep. 569; Everingham v. Meighan, 55 Wis. 354; S. C., 13
N. W. Rep. 269; Lowry v. Dillman, 59 Wis. 197.
A future contract is not illegal, however, merely because it
is in fact settled by the payment of differences. It is the
original intent of the parties that governs; and if that be for a
bona fide execution of the contract by delivery, even though
contemplating the possibility of a settlement by way of adjust-
ing differences, the contract is valid in its inception, and either
party may waive his right to actual execution, and make a set-
tlement on the basis of differences in price, which will not
render the contract void: Clarke v. Foss, 7 Biss. C. Ct. 540;
Boyd v. Hanson, 41 Fed. Rep. 174; Univ. Stock Exch. v. Stevens,
66 L. T. N. S. 612. The existence of the illegal intent is
not necessarily to be inferred from the final settlement [though
it would seem to be a strong indication of it]: Ware v.
Jordan, 25 Ill. App. 534; see Porter v. Viets, i Biss.
C. Ct. 177.
Similarly, the fact that the transaction was carried on
through a broker, by means of margins furnished him to secure
him against any loss 'vhich he. might suffer on his principal's
account, is not an infallible sign of a wagering contract. The
intent to deliver may exist in such a case, and the margin may
be demanded only as an earnest to secure the delivery of
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the goods, or the payment of the purchase price: Preston v.
R. R., 36 Fed. Rep. 54; Union Nat'l Bk. v. Car, 16 Cent. L. ..
320; Fisher v..Fisher, 113 Ind. 474; S. C., 15 N. E. Rep. 832.
III. In order to invalidate a future contract, the illegal
intent must be mutual: Connor v. Heman, 44 Mo. App. 346.
If either party intends a bona fide execution, the contract is
good as to him, and 'will be enforced at his suit. The secret
intention of the other party cannot affect his rights: Clarke v.
Foss, 7 Biss. C. Ct. 540; Bartlett v. Smith, 13 Fed. Rep. 263;
BAngs v. Hornick, 3o Fed. Rep. 97; Lehman v. Feld, 37 Fed.
Rep. 852; Edwards v. Hoeffinghoff, 38 Fed. Rep. 635;
Boyd v. Hanson, 4r Fed. Rep. 174; Pixley v. Boynton, 79
Ill. 351; Carroll v. Holmes, 24 Ill. App. 453; Benson v.
Morgan, 26 Ill. App. 22; Wheeler v. McDermid, 36 Ill. App.
179; Whitesides v. Hunt, 97 Ind. 191 ; Murry v. Ocheltree,
59 Iowa, 435; S. C., 13 N. W. Rep. 41r; Gregory v. Wen-
dell, 39 Mich. 337; Williams v. Tiedeman, 6 Mo. App. 269;
Cockrell v. Thompson, 85 Mo. 5 IO ; Hentz v. Miner, 64 Hun.
tN. Y.) 636; S. C., 18 N. Y. Suppl. 88o; Williams v. Carr,
8o N. C. 294; Wall v. Schneider, 59 Wis. 352; Ashton v.
Dakin, 4 H. & N. 867.
IV. In consequence of the manner in which these transac-
tions are now carried on through the medium of Exchanges
and Boards of Trade, it very rarely happens that a future con-
tract is made directly between the parties. It is usually
effected through the medium of a broker employed for that
purpose; and this introduces a new element for considerition,
viz.: whether the broker, thus employed, is to'be viewed as
a mere agent, unaffected by the illegal iritent of the parties, or
whether he is so far affected by that intent as to be precluded
from recovering advances and commissions on account of such
contract.
The rule in England, as laid down in Thacker v. Hardy,
4 Q. B. D. 685; S. C., 27 W. R. 158, seems to be, that the
broker, even with knowledge of the customer's illegal intent, is
merely the agent of the latter; and that as there is no agree-
ment between him and the customer to buy or sell, there is no
illegality in his employment, and he can recover advances and
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commissions: Rosewarne v. Billing, 15 C. B. N. S. 316; see,
however, Cooper v. Neil, U. N., i878, p. 128. But in America
the far more reasonable rule is adopted that "when the broker
is privy to the unlawful design of the parties, and brings them
together for the very purpose of entering into an illegal agree-
ment, he is particeps ciiminis, and cannot recover for services
rendered or losses incurred by himself on behalf of either in
forwarding the transaction:" Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 49 9 ;
S. C., 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. i6o; Embrey v. Jamison, 131 U. S.
336; S. C., 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 776; Re Green, 7 Biss. C. Ct.
338; Phelps v. Holderness, 56 Ark. 300; S. C., i9 S. W.
Rep. 921; Walters v. Comer (Ga.), 5 S. E. Rep. 292; Bk. v.
Cunningham, 75 Ga. 366; Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Ill. 496;
S. C., 16 N. E. Rep. 646; Wheeler v. McDermid, 36 Ill.
App. 179; Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. 289; Harvey V.
Merrill, i5o Mass. i; S. C., 22 N. E. Rep. 49; Hill v. John-
son, 38 Mo. App. 383; Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498;
Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio.St- 195 ; S. C., 2o N. E. Rep. 203 ;
Lester v. Buel (Ohio), 3o N. E. Rep. 821 ; Fareira v. Gabell,
89 Pa. 89; Dickson v. Thomas, 97 Pa. 278. One who deals
with a broker deals with him as a principal, not 'as an agent:
Ruchizky v. De Haven, 97 Pa. 202. It does not matter that
some of the parties with whom the broker dealt were actual
buyers and sellers. The illegal intent pervades the whole
course of dealing: Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Pa. 89; Miles v.
Andrews, 4o Ill. App. 155. The question is purely between
the broker and the customer, and his dealings with third par-
ties are immaterial on the question of the understanding between
them: Griswold v. Gregg, 24 Ill. App. 384; Kennedy v.
Stout, 26 Ill. App. 133 ; Miles v. Andrews, 4o Ill. App. 155.
Two cases only appear to favor the English rule: Taylor v.
Penquite, 35 Mo. App. 389, which rests on a mistake as to
the decision in Cockrell v. Thompson, 85 Mo.. 5io; and
Barnes v. Smith (Mass.), 34 N. E. Rep. 403, which seems to
ciing to the idea that the broker is the agent only of the
customer; but these are of no weight against the preponder-
ance of authority cited.
If, however, the broker is ignorant of the illegal design of
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his customer, and acts in good faith, the contract is good as to
him, and he can recover his advances, commissions and losses:
Rountree v. Smith, 15 Repr. 6o9; Irwin v. Williar, I io
U. S. 499; S. C., 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. i6o; Lehman v' Feld, 37
Fed. Rep. 852; Edwards v. Hoeffinghoff, 38 Fed. Rep. 635;
Boyd v. Hanson, 41 Fed. Rep. 174; Murry v. Ocheltree, 59
Iowa, 435; S.C., 13,N. W. Rep. 4ii; Villiams v. Carr, 8o
N. C. 294; Potts v. Dunlap, IIO Pa. i77; S. C., 2o Atl.
Rep. 413.
V. As the intent of the parties is the criterion of the nature
of the contract, anything which goes to show that intent is
admissible as evidence in a suit founded on the contract:
Yerkes v. Salomon, i i Hun. (N. Y.) 471; Cassard v. Hinman,
6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 14; Hentz v. Miner, S8 Hun. 428; S. C.,
1 2 N. Y. Suppl. 474. All the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, and the conduct of the parties vith reference to it,
are legitimate evidence on. this question: Boyd v. Hanson,
41 Fed. Rep. 174; Hill v. Johnson, 38 Mo. App. 383. The
general course of dealing between the parties is some evidence,
though not conclusive, of the nature of the transaction in
question: Watte v. Costello, 40 Ill. App. 307; Lowev. Young,
59 Iowa, 364; S..C., 13 N.W. Rep. 329; Kenyon v. Luther,
4 N. Y. Suppl. 498 ;-S. C. aff., ioN. Y. Suppl. 95i. And so
is the general course of dealing of the Board or Exchange, of
which the broker is a member: Beveridge v. Hewitt, 8,Itl.
App. 467. But it is not allowable to give in evidence special
instances of illegal transactions, either with the party to the-
contract, or with third persons: Gruner v. Stucken (La.),
3 So. 338; Dwight v. Badgley, 6o Hun;. (N.. Y.) 144; S. C.,,
14 N. Y. Suppl. 498; Potts v. Dunlap, I io Pa. 177; S. C.,
20 Atl. Rep. 1413. Even the subsequent acts of the parties
may be evidence of their original intent: Clarke v. Foss,
7 Biss. C. Ct. 540.
The rules of the Board or Exchange on whose floor the
dealings are carried on are admissible on the construction of the
contract: Bartlett v. Smith, 13 Fed. Rep. 263; Bibb v. Allen,
149 U. S. 4 8i ; S. C., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950. When the rules
provide that if further margins are not put up on notice, the
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contract may be treated as filled, and the other party may
recover the difference between the contract and market price,
without any performance or offer to perform on his part, they
will make a contract good on its face illegal and void: Lyon
v. Culbertson, 83 IL. 33; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 349. But if
the illegal intent be otherwise proven, the rules cannot be
invoked to show that, according to them, actual delivery must
be made: Mackey v. Rausch, 6o Hun. (N. Y.) 583; S. C.,
15 N. Y. Suppl. 4.
The ability of the parties to perform their contracts is a very
material circumstance; for if their means are wholly dispro-
portioned to the value of the goods purchased, the inference is
.strong that the transaction is not bona fide: Beveridge v.
Hewitt, 8 I1l. App. 467; Curtis v. Wright, 40 Ill. App. 491;
Myers v. Tobias (Pa.), 16 Atl. Rep. 641 ; S. C,, 24 W. N. C.
.432; Gaw v. Bennett, 153 Pa. 247; S. C., 31 W. N. C. 557;
25 Atl. Rep. 1114; Watte v. Wickersham, 27 Neb. 457;
S. C., 43 N. W. Rep. 259. It has also been held that when
the sum deposited with the broker bears no proper proportion
to the value of the stock ordered, the inference is that a gam-
bling contract was intended; but this is hardly co nsonant with
the weight of authority: Patterson's App. (Pa.), 13 W. N. C.
154.
When the evidence showed that the brokers were willing to
buy or sell for the customer at their own risk without inquiry
as to his financial ability, so long as he put up the necessary
"'margins;" that when he failed to advance further funds, the
brokers, without offering to deliver or demanding the price of
-the cotton, promptly closed out the contract and demanded the
difference between the contract and market price, th& facts show
a gambling contract: Phelps v. Holderness, 56 Ark. 300;
*S. C.,. 19 S. W. Rep. 921. So, evidence that the customer
was not a refiner of oil, or one who would buy for his own
consumption; that he had not sold the oil when he exercised
his option; that he did not intend to exercise it if the market
price fell below that fixed in the agreement, joined to proof
that he was financially unable to take and pay for the whole
amount of oil he had contracted for, leads to the conviction
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that the contract was a gambling one: Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall,
72 Pa. 155. But when the customer pays a part of the pur-
chase price, leaves stock with the broker till paid for, and
directs him to sell it again, the contract is valid: Eggleston v.
Rumble, 66 Hun. (N. Y.) 627; S. C., 2o N. Y. Suppl. 819.
And when the wheat purchased is delivered in the form of
warehouse receipts, which would entitle the purchasers to
actual delivery of it on presentation thereof, the transaction is
good: Fisher v. Fisher, the principal case (Ind.), 36 N. E.
Rep. 296.
Ordinarily, the burden of proof lies on the party assert-
ing the illegality of a contract good on its face: Benson
v. Mdrgan, 26 Ill. App. 22; Mohr v. Miesen, 47 Minn. 228;
S. C., 49 N.W. Rep. 862; Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N.Y. 92.
But though an illegal intent will not be presumed: Story
v. Salomon, 71 N. Y. 420; yet experiencE has so proved the
likelihood of illegal intent in future contracts, that the tendency
seems now to be to put the burden of proof on the one who,
seeks to enforce the contract, at least when a doubt has been
cast upon it by the testimony of the opposite party: Wheeler
v. McDermid, 36 Ill. App. 179; First Nat'l Bk. v. Oskaloosa
Co., 66 Iowa, 41.; S. C., 23 N. W. Rep. 255; Sprague v.
Warren, 26 Neb. 326; S. C.,41 N.W. Rep. iI13; Cobb v.
Prell, 16 Cent. L.J. 453; Barnard v. BAckhaus, 52 Wis. 593.
VI. In Illinois, the statute against dealing in fntures is
peculiarly strict. "Whoever contracts to have or give to him-
self or another the option to sell or buy at a future time any
grain or other commodity, stock of any railroad or other com-
pany, or gold .... shall be fined . . . .,and all contracts,
made in violation of this section shall be considered gambling
contracts, and shall be void: " Cr. Code Ill., § 130. It is the.
rule under this statute that any future contract, other than an
actual sale, is void: Webster v. Sturges, 7 II1. App. 56o;
Locke v. Fowler, 41 Ill. App. 66; Schneider v. Turner, i30'
Ill. 28; S.C., 22 N. E. Rep. 497; Aff. S. C., 27 Ill. App. 220;
Peatce v. Foote, 113 Ill. 228 ; Corcoran v. Coal Co., 138 IIl
390; S. C., 28 N. E. Rep. 759; but see Richter v. Frank, 41
Fed. Rep. 859. The same seems to be the rule in Iowa: Osgood
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iv. Bauder, 82 Iowa, 171; S. C., 4Z N. W. IOOI. This, how-
ever, applies to optional sales only. If the sale be absolute,
and the delivery only is future, the contract is still valid:
White v. Barber, 123 U. S. 392; S. C., 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221;
Wolcott v. Heath, 78 Ill. 433; Logan v. Br6wn, 81 Ill. 415.
VII. When the contract is illegal, and cannot be enforced,
a security founded on that contract is void in the hands of the
principal, of the broker, if particeps criminis, or of a purchaser
with notice: Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61 ; Re Green, 7 Biss.
C. Ct. 338; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336; S. C., 9 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 776; Brown v. Alexander, 29 I1. App. 626; Cothran
v. Ellis, 125 Ill. 496; S. C., 16 N. E. Rep. 646; Davis
v. Davis, 119 Ind. 511; S. C., 21 N. E. Rep. 1112; S'artz's
App., 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 13 1; Griffith's App., 16 W. N. C. (Pa.)
249; Dempsey v. Harm (Pa.), 12 At. Rep. 27; -S. C., 9 Cent.
Rep. 615; Brua's App., 55 Pa. 294; Fareira v. Gabell,
89 Pa. 89; Griffiths v. Sears, 112 Pa. 523; Oliphant v.
Markham, 79 Tex. 543; S. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 569; Barnard
v. Backhaus, 52 Wis. 593. If the broker be innocent he can
recover, and so can a bona fide holder: Lehman v.Strasberger,
2 Woods C. Ct. 554; Pearce v. Rice, 142 U. S. 28; S. C.,
12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13o; Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 7,;
Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498, But when the making of
such a contract is declared a crime by statute, a security
founded thereon is void, even in the hands of a bona fide
holder: Hawley v. Bibb, 69 Ala. 52; Cunningham v. Bank,
17 Cent. L. J. 470; Bank v. Cunningham, 75 Ga. 366;
Snoddy v. Bank, 88 Tenn. 573; Bank v. Carroll, 8o Iowa, i ;
S. C., 45 N. W. Rep. 304.
VIII. One who is a party to such an illegal contract cannot,
either at common law or in equity, recover money paid in
furtherance of the transaction. As we have seen the broker
cannot recover his advances on behalf of his principal, nor
can the principal recover the money deposited with the broker
as margins: Lawton *v. Blitch, 83 Ga. 663; S. C., 10 S. E.
Rep. 353; O'Brien v. Luques, 81 Me. 46; S. C., 16 Atl.
Rep. 304; Burt v. Myer, 71 Md. 467; Gregory v. Clark,
39 Mich. 337; Ruchizky v. De Haven, 97 Pa. 202; Stewart
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v. Parnell, 147 Pa. 523; S. C., 29 W. N. C. 537; 23 At..
Rep. 83 8; Sowles v. Bank, 61 Vt. 375; S. C., 17 Atl.
Rep. 791. There are occasional exceptions to this rule.
Thus the customer can recover if he intended a bonacfide sale
and delivery: Gregory v. Clark, 39 Mich. 337. A minor can
recover money so paid by him during minority: Ruchizky v.
De Haven, 97 Pa. 202. When the broker acknowledges a
balance in his hands in favor of the customer, the latter may
recover, if he can show that the broker received the money
for his use: Peters v. Grim (Pa.), 30 W. N. C. 177; S. C.,
24 Atl. Rep. I92; Repplier v. Jacobs, 3oW. N. C. i8o; S. C.,
24 Atl. Rep. 194; Floyd v. Patterson, 72 Tex. 202; S. C.,
i o S. W. Rep. 526. So a deposit of margins can be recovered
if the customer revoke his illegal instructions: Dancy v.
Phelan, 82.Ga. 243; S. C., 1o S. E. Rep. 205. Or if his
complaint does not on its face show an illegal contract: Clarke
v. Brown, 77 Ga. 6o6.
By statute, however, such payments are made recoverable
in many of the States of the Union. The question depends
on the wording of the particular statute; but in general either
party may recover of the other.: Cushman v. Root, 89 Cal. 373;
S. C., 26 Pac. Rep. 883; Kennedy v. Stout, 26 Ill. App. 133;
N. Y. & Chic. Grain'& Stock Exch. v. Mellen, 27 Ill. App.
556.; Lyons v. Hodges (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 1076; Peck v.
Doran, 46 Hun. (N. Y.) 454; Copley v. Doran, i N. Y.
Suppl. 888; Lester v. Buel (Ohio), 30 N. E. Rep. 82 1
Though it has been held that the broker cannot recover in'
Illinois: White v. Barber, 123 U. S. 392; S. C., 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 221.
One who knowingly lends money for the purpose of further-
ing a gambling transaction in futures cannot recover it:
Waugh v. Beck, 114 Pa. 422; Plank v. Jackson, 128 Ind.
424; S. C., 26 N. E. Rep. 568, but if he take no part in the
transaction mere knowledge on his part that the money was
to be so used, will not preclude him from recovery: Arm-
strong -i. Bank, 133 U. S. 433; S. C., io Sup. Ct. Rep. 4"50;
Jackson v. Bank, 125 Ind. 347; S. C., 25 N. E: Rep. 430
The true test is whether or not he requires the aid of the
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illegal tra'.action to make out his case; if so, he cannot
recover; if not, he can: Armstrong v. Bank, su&a.
IX. In all cases of alleged gambling contracts in futures,
the question as to, their nature is one of fact, not of law; for
the jury, not for the court: Washer v. Bond, 4o Kans. 84;
S. C., i 9 Pac. Rep. 323; Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Pa. 89;
Thompson v. Reiber, 123 Pa. 457; S. C., 23 W. N. C. i8o;
16 Atl. Rep. 793.
X. There is one very curious kind of future contract that
has frequently come before the courts during the past few
years. This is what is known- as a "Bohemian Oats"-con-
tract. By it a quantity of oats, professedly of a special brand,
but in reality of ordinary kind, is sold to a farmer at a
price far above its real value, and a bond is given by the
seller to buy back a certain number of bushels of the crop at
a high figure, promising a profit to the unwary agriculturist.
With but one exception, Watson v. Blossom, 2 N. Y. Suppl.
551; S. C. Aff., 4 N.Y. S0ppl. 489, these contracts have
been held illegal as against public policy, and notes given on
them void, except in the hands of a bonafde holder, subject
to the exception in the latter case due to the operation of
criminal statutes, as explained in Schmueckle v. Waters,
125 Ind. 265; S. C., 25 N. E.Rep. 281; Glass v. Murphy
(Ind. App.), 30 N. E. Rep. 1097; Kain v. Bare (Ind. App.),
31 N. E. Rep. 205; Merrill v. Packer, 8o Iowa, 542; S. C.,
45 N. V. Rep. 1076; Shipley v. Reasoner, 8o Iowa, 548;
S. C., 45 N. W. Rep. 1077; Sutton v. Beckwith, 68 Mich. 3o3;
S. C., 36 N. W. Rep. 79; Mace v. Kennedy, 68 Mich. *389;
S. C., 36 N. W. Rep. I7; McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich.
454; S. C., 36 N. W. Rep. 218. The first Iowa case on this
subject, Hanks v. Brown, 79 Iowa, 56o;' S. C., 44 N. W.
Rep. 81 1, decided that such a contract was not obnoxious to
the statute of that State against gambling contracts, strangely
enough forgetting all about the common law and public
policy; but this omission has been corrected by the later cases
from that State cited above.
XI. A contract to "corner" the market by buying up
stock or goods is illegal at common law as against public
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